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ABSTRACT 
THE ROLE OF PERCEIVED COLLECTIVE ANGER AND FEAR ON POLICY 
SUPPORT IN RESPONSE TO TERRORIST THREAT 
FEBRUARY 2010 
JAESHIN KIM, B.A., KOREA UNIVERSITY 
M.A., KOREA UNIVERSITY 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
Directed by: Professor Linda R. Tropp 
 
The current research investigates how the perceived emotional responses of a majority of 
Americans to 9/11 (i.e., collective anger and fear) affect individuals’ support for 
governmental policies, in particular, military intervention, anti-immigration policy, and 
restricting civil liberties. Study 1 found that perceived collective anger was associated 
with support for military intervention and anti-immigration policy, and that those effects 
of perceived collective anger on policy support were significantly driven by individuals’ 
own anger. Study 2 showed that experimentally manipulated collective anger (i.e., 
exposure to the majority’s anger relative to the minority’s anger) had marginal effects on 
support for anti-immigration policy and restricting civil liberties, and individuals’ own 
anger mediated the marginal effect of collective anger on support for restricting civil 
liberties. Participants exposed to either the majority’s or minority’s fear supported anti-
immigration policy and restricting civil liberties as strongly as did those exposed to the 
majority’s anger. Implications and limitations of these findings were discussed.   
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CHAPTER 1 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Introduction 
In response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center 
and the Pentagon, the U.S. government moved quickly to take an action against terrorism. 
The Bush Administration launched the bombing of Afghanistan, and the Congress passed 
the USA PATRIOT Act allowing law enforcement powers to detain foreign nationals or 
immigrants suspected of terrorism. Although some U.S. citizens criticized the foreign 
policy of the U.S. government, these actions were largely supported by a majority of U.S. 
citizens. According to national polls conducted in the month immediately following the 
9/11 attacks, 82-91 % of Americans approved of the Bush administration’s military action 
against terrorism and 55-79 % of Americans showed their willingness to sacrifice some 
civil liberties to fight terrorism (Huddy, Khatib, & Capelos, 2002). Anti-immigrant 
sentiments also became evident. A public opinion survey showed that 58 % of 
respondents endorsed decreasing immigration levels after the 9/11 attacks, compared to 
41 % in the survey conducted prior to the attacks (Gallup Poll, 2008). 
How did a majority of Americans come to support anti-terrorism policies? Since 
9/11, many studies have focused on the role of the U.S. citizens’ emotional responses to 
the attacks in supporting the governmental policies (e.g., Cheung-Blunden & Blunden, 
2008a, 2008b; Sadler, Lineberger, Correll, & Park, 2005; Skitka, Bauman, Aramovich, & 
Morgan, 2006; Skitka, Bauman, & Mullen, 2004; Small, Lerner, & Fischhoff, 2006). For 
example, Americans whose emotional responses were dominated by anger tended to 
endorse military action and reject humanitarian efforts, compared to other emotions such 
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as fear and sadness (Sadler et al., 2005). 
In addition to individual Americans’ own emotional responses to 9/11, their 
political opinions may be influenced by other Americans’ emotional responses. How do 
Americans respond to governmental counter-terrorism policies when most other 
Americans seem angry about the 9/11 attacks? Does this perception lead them to support 
military intervention? Recent work has suggested that perceptions of the majority’s 
emotions following a certain group-level event can affect individual group members’ 
attitudinal, and behavioral responses to the event in the direction of perceived collective 
emotions (Bar-Tal, 2001; Bar-Tal, Halperin, & de Rivera, 2007). Particularly relevant is 
Conejero and Etxebarria’s (2007) study, conducted after the terrorist attacks in Madrid on 
March 11, 2004, which showed that individuals’ own negative emotional responses to the 
attacks and their perception of prevalent negative emotions (e.g., anger, fear) in their 
society predicted their avoidant behavior toward Muslims or Basques.  
In sum, while many studies have demonstrated the effects of individuals’ own 
emotional responses to the 9/11 terrorist attacks on their attitudes and judgments (e.g., 
Sadler et al., 2005; Skitka et al., 2006; Skitka et al., 2004; Small et al., 2006), little is 
known about how perceptions of Americans’ collective emotional responses contribute to 
shaping individual Americans’ post 9/11 emotions and policy support. In the current 
research, I investigate how perceived collective emotional responses to 9/11 affect 
individuals’ emotions and attitudes. This research examines these issues to better 
understand the psychological mechanisms underlying the tendency for people to support 
governmental counter-terrorism policies following the 9/11 terrorist attacks.   
Emotional Responses to Group Threat 
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Researchers have long recognized the important role of emotions in group life 
(e.g., Freud, 1921/1953; Le Bon, 1895; McDougall, 1920/1973). Moscovici (1986) also 
argued that when individuals are in a group, they are more likely to respond to a group 
event, by being prompted from their emotional impulses.  
Focusing more specifically on individuals’ psychological process within a group, 
Intergroup Emotions Theory (IET; Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; Smith, 1993, 1999) 
postulates that when group membership is salient, the situations or events related to one’s 
group are appraised and experienced by individuals on a group basis even if they have no 
direct effect on individual group members. Also, research on IET suggests that specific 
emotions triggered by different appraisals of situations or events induce differentiated 
action tendencies (Mackie et al., 2000; Smith, Seger, & Mackie, 2007). Individuals who 
perceive the ingroup as strong are more likely to experience anger toward the outgroup 
and to show desire to take action against it (Mackie et al., 2000). 
In addition to individuals’ own emotions which are derived from their group 
membership, recent work has suggested that individuals’ attitudes and behaviors are 
affected by their perceptions of others’ emotions. Indeed, work by Bar-Tal (2001; Bar-Tal 
et al., 2007) has argued that collective emotional responses – that is, perceptions of the 
group’s prevailing emotional responses to group events – can affect individual group 
members’ emotional, attitudinal, and behavioral responses to these events (see also 
Conejero & Etxebarria, 2007). By perceiving others’ emotions, people may grow to 
experience the same emotions or use them as guides for their own attitudes and behaviors.  
Specific Emotional Responses to Terrorist Threat 
Public opinion polls found that anger was the dominant emotional response to the 
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9/11 terrorist attacks. A national poll found that 37% of Americans reported anger as their 
primary emotion, 24 % chose sadness, and 6 % chose fear (NBC News/Wall Street 
Journal Poll, September 12, 2001). Similarly, another poll showed that anger and 
frustration topped the list (26%), compared to 21% who mentioned sorrow or sadness and 
7% who chose fear as their best described emotional response to 9/11 (Los Angeles 
Times Poll Alert, September 16, 2001). Research has found that individuals’ anger 
response to 9/11 is a strong predictor of support for counter-terrorism policies, in 
particular, military intervention against terrorism (e.g., Cheung-Blunden & Blunden, 
2008a; Sadler et al., 2005).  
Although fear was reported by only a minority of people for their primary 
response to 9/11, its effects were evident in many people’s sense of vulnerability. In a 
nationwide study, 52% of respondents reported that the terrorist attacks had shaken their 
sense of personal safety and security a great deal or some (Huddy, Feldman, Taber, & 
Lahav, 2005). Also, 86% reported that they were very or somewhat concerned about 
future terrorist attacks and 68% reported concerns on potential harm to themselves and 
their friends and family as a result of terrorism. Supporting this, individuals experiencing 
fear in response to 9/11 perceive higher risk of future events rather than anger (Lerner, 
Gonzalez, Small, & Fischoff, 2003). Hence, many researchers have focused on the effects 
of anger and fear in response to the 9/11 attacks on Americans’ post 9/11 attitudes and 
behaviors (e.g., Sadler et al., 2005; Skitka et al., 2006; Skitka et al., 2004; Small et al., 
2006).  
Anger 
Anger can be conceptualized as resulting from appraisals that someone else is responsible 
for an aversive event and that the self has a strong position relative to that person (Frijda, 
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Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989; Mackie et al., 2000; Smith & Lazarus, 1993). In intergroup 
contexts, research has shown that anger triggered by a threat to the ingroup leads to a 
desire to take an action against outgroup members (Devos, Silver, Mackie, & Smith, 
2002). Being reminded of 9/11, anger felt by Americans tends to be directed primarily at 
the terrorists and their affiliated groups (Sadler et al., 2005).  
Anger may therefore underlie why many Americans supported governmental 
policies endorsing military intervention following the attacks (Cheung-Blunden & 
Blunden, 2008a, 2008b; Lerner et al., 2003; Sadler et al., 2005). For example, Cheung-
Blunden and Blunden (2008b) showed that Americans experiencing anger about the 9/11 
terrorist attacks endorsed military action and rejected humanitarian efforts. In another 
study, anger evoked by the 9/11 terrorist attacks led people to support vengeful policies 
more strongly and conciliatory policies less strongly (Lerner et al., 2003). 
Individuals experiencing anger also tend to support domestic policies of counter-
terrorism. Being reminded of 9/11, angry individuals reported that they changed their 
attitudes more negatively toward new immigrants, Arab Americans, and those who live in 
Islamic or Middle Eastern countries, compared to their attitudes prior to 9/11 (Skitka et 
al., 2004). Similarly, the more individuals’ emotional responses were dominated by anger, 
the stronger their support for severe reduction of immigration from the Middle East 
(Sadler et al., 2005).  
Though not directly related to attitudes toward the outgroup, anger is also 
associated with support for domestic surveillance or restriction of civil liberties. Angry 
individuals tend to endorse fewer constraints on law enforcement, making it easier to 
obtain warrants for searches, seizures, and surveillance (Sadler et al., 2005). Moreover, 
people experiencing anger have been shown to believe that the Bush administration had 
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not gone far enough on restricting civil liberties to fight terrorism (Skitka et al., 2004).  
Fear 
In contrast to anger, when one perceives the self to be weak relative to another, fear is the 
more likely emotional response to a threat (Mackie et al., 2000). Intergroup situations 
eliciting fear response may prompt a motive of protection by escaping from or avoiding 
an opposing outgroup, while anger may lead to take an action against the outgroup 
(Devos et al., 2002). Compared to strong evidence supporting the relationship between 
anger and counter-terrorism policy support, however, evidence on the relationship 
between fear and counter-terrorism policy support is less clear. Several studies found that 
individuals’ fear responses to 9/11 were negatively or not significantly associated with 
support of military intervention against terrorism (Huddy et al., 2005; Sadler et al., 2005; 
Skitka et al., 2006). On the other hand, some positive relations of fear to a desire for 
vengeance or support for military action have been found (Cheung-Blunden & Blunden, 
2008a; Skitka et al., 2004). Despite this variation, when the effects of anger and fear are 
examined together, anger is a stronger predictor than fear of support of military 
intervention against terrorism or opposition of conciliatory policy (Cheung-Blunden & 
Blunden, 2008a; Lerner et al., 2003; Skitka et al., 2004). 
Fear is also associated with support of domestic counter-terrorism policy. 
Individuals who experience higher levels of fear are more likely to report that their 
attitudes toward new immigrants (Arab Americans) and people living in Middle East 
were more negatively changed after 9/11 (Skitka et al., 2004). However, compared to 
anger, fear was weakly associated with support for anti-immigration policy (see Lerner et 
al., 2003; Sadler et al., 2005). Additionally, one study found that fear was positively 
associated with support for restricting civil liberties to fight terrorism as strongly as anger 
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(Skitka et al., 2004), and another study showed that fear was unrelated to support for 
restricting civil liberties while anger was significantly associated with support for this 
policy (Sadler et al., 2005). 
In sum, anger and fear appear to predict attitudes and behaviors under terrorist 
threat, yet more work is needed to understand the role each plays. The general trend, 
however, is that anger seems to lead to support of international and domestic counter-
terrorism policies more strongly than fear.  
Collective Emotional Responses 
Each individual may experience emotional responses on behalf of their group, but 
collective emotional responses are distinct from these individuals’ group-based emotional 
responses. Collective emotional responses can be defined as emotions that are perceived 
to be shared by a majority of group members in response to group-level events (see Bar-
Tal et al., 2007; de Rivera & Páez, 2007; Fernández-Dols, Carrera, de Mendoza, & Oceja, 
2007). This definition of collective emotion is distinct from group-based emotion as 
defined by IET, which instead refers to the emotions individual group members 
experience on behalf of their group. Group-based emotions are felt by group members in 
response to group events as a result of their identification of a group, while collective 
emotional responses are perceived by group members (see Bar-Tal et al., 2007; de Rivera, 
1992). Both concepts are based on the same assumption that individuals may experience 
emotions in response to a group event regardless of its consequence on their personal life. 
However, the concept of collective emotional response focuses on the role of perceiver 
that individuals play within a group, rather than the role of group member who feels an 
emotional bond with a group. 
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Collective emotional responses may be perceived when group members focus 
their attention on a specific event that is meaningful to the group (see de Rivera, 1992, 
Smith & Crandell, 1984), or when the group celebrates a collective success, laments a 
tragedy, or suffers a common threat (Conejero & Etxebarria, 2007). Under group threat, 
individuals may also inaccurately estimate the nature or intensity of other people’s 
emotional responses. Researchers have suggested several different reasons underlying 
this misperception such as self-interest (Miller, & McFarland, 1999) or the availability of 
and exposure to information (O’Gorman 1986; Prentice & Miller, 1993; Shamir & 
Shamir, 1997). For example, people’s perceptions of specific issues may be correlated 
with the prominence of media coverage on those issues (Shamir & Shamir, 1997). Being 
reminded of terrorist attacks, people may overestimate other people’s fear and anger, 
biased by extensive media coverage using repetitive images and emotional-laden 
language (Cho et al., 2003). Indeed, in response to the terrorist attacks in Spain, people 
perceived others to experience negative emotions (e.g., anger, fear) more intensely than 
they themselves experienced (Conejero & Etxebarria, 2007). 
Potential Mechanisms for the Effects of Collective Emotions 
How do collective emotional responses affect individuals’ attitudes and behaviors? First, 
a group member may be influenced by other members’ expressed emotions through 
emotional contagion. Emotional contagion can be defined as the tendency to 
automatically mimic and synchronize others’ displayed emotions, which consequently 
leads to convergence emotionally (Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1994). Although most 
of the evidence for emotional contagion has derived from interpersonal relationships, 
several studies have suggested that transmission of emotions can occur within groups 
(e.g., Barsade, 2002; Totterdell, Kellett, Teuchmann, & Briner, 1998). 
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Second, perceptions of group members’ shared emotions may exert normative 
influence on individual group members. Social influence research has shown that when 
individuals perceive their private attitudes to be different from the majority’s attitudes, 
they change their attitudes and behaviors in the direction of the perceived group norm 
(e.g., Miller & McFarland, 1991; Miller, Monin, & Prentice, 2000; Sabini, Cosmas, 
Siepmann, & Stein, 1999; Sul & Wan, 1987). For example, in Prentice and Miller’s 
(1993) study of attitude change among college students, male students shifted their 
attitudes toward alcohol drinking in the direction of what they believed other students felt 
about drinking. Although past research has focused on these processes in the context of 
attitudes or judgments, it is plausible that the same principle would apply in the context 
of emotions.  
Evidence for the Effects of Collective Emotions 
Whether through emotional contagion or normative processes, research suggests that 
perceived collective emotional responses affect individuals’ attitudes and behaviors 
through changing their emotional responses to group events. To date, however, little 
research has examined how collective emotional responses to group-level events affect 
individual group members’ emotions and attitudes. To the author’s knowledge, only one 
published study examined the influence of collective emotions on individuals’ attitudes. 
Conejero and Etxebarria (2007) conducted a study immediately following the terrorist 
attacks in Madrid, Spain on March 11, 2004. They investigated relationships between 
individuals’ own emotional responses to the attacks and their perceptions of collective 
emotional responses to the attacks. They found that respondents generally perceived 
others to experience both positive and negative emotions more intensely than they 
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themselves experienced. Pooling these emotions, the results showed that, overall, 
individuals’ negative emotional responses predicted avoidance of Muslims and Basques, 
yet the addition of negative collective emotional responses only slightly increased the 
prediction of these avoidant tendencies.  
Although the study by Conejero and Etxebarria (2007) examined collective 
emotional responses in the context of terrorist threat, there are important limitations to 
this work. First, drawing on findings from post 9/11 research (e.g., Cheung-Blunden & 
Blunden, 2008a; Lerner et al., 2003) and Intergroup Emotions Theory (e.g., Devos et al., 
2002), we must consider the differentiated effects of distinct negative collective emotions, 
such as collective anger and fear. Second, Conejero and Etxebarria (2007) examined 
relationships among the variables only using questionnaire responses, whereas 
experimental manipulations of collective emotional responses are necessary to provide 
direct evidence of the effects of collective emotional responses on policy support.  
The Current Research 
In the current research, I use both survey and experimental methods to address the 
question of whether Americans’ perception of collective anger and fear responses to 9/11 
can influence their support for counter-terrorism policies. In Study 1, using correlational 
data, I first examine whether perceived collective emotional responses are distinct from 
individuals’ own emotional responses to 9/11. I also test whether perceived collective 
emotional responses are associated with counter-terrorism policy support, using 
correlational (Study 1) and experimental (Study 2) research designs. Drawing from the 
findings from post 9/11 studies and research on collective emotions, I propose that 
perceived collective anger and fear will increase individuals’ support for counter-
terrorism policies. More specifically, I expect that perceived collective anger will be 
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associated with counter-terrorism policy support more strongly than fear. I further 
examine whether perceived collective anger and fear predict counter-terrorism policy 
support above and beyond the contribution of individuals’ own anger and fear.  
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CHAPTER 2 
STUDY 1: CORRELATIONAL TESTS OF PERCEIVED COLLECTIVE EMOTIONAL 
RESPONSE EFFECTS 
Design and Hypotheses 
The goal of Study 1 is to provide an initial test of the relationships between 
collective- and individual-level emotions in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the 
effects of perceived collective anger and fear on people’s support for counter-terrorism 
policies. I propose the following hypotheses:  
 
Hypothesis 1: Perceived collective emotional responses to 9/11 will be distinct from 
individuals’ own emotional responses to 9/11. Drawing from Intergroup Emotions Theory 
(Mackie et al., 2000), I hypothesize that collective anger and fear will be distinguishable 
from individuals’ own anger and fear respectively, and that anger will be distinct from 
fear at both individual and collective levels.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Despite their distinguishability, perceived collective emotional responses to 
9/11 will be associated with individuals’ own emotional responses. Based on the 
emotional contagion (Hatfield et al., 1994) and social influence literatures (e.g., Miller & 
McFarland, 1991), I predict positive correlations between collective anger and own anger, 
and between collective fear and own fear.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Perceived collective emotional responses will predict counter-terrorism 
policy support. Based on recent work on collective emotions (e.g., Conejero & Etxebarria, 
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2007) and post 9/11 research (e.g., Cheung-Blunden & Blunden, 2008a; Lerner et al., 
2003), I hypothesize that perceived collective anger and fear will both predict individuals’ 
support for counter-terrorism policies, yet that perceived collective anger will be a 
stronger predictor of policy support than fear.  
Methods 
Participants and Procedure 
Participants were 137 undergraduate students at the University of Massachusetts 
Amherst. Data collection was conducted from March to July, 2009. Participants were 
approached at the end of class time by permission of the class teacher, and asked whether 
they would like to participate in the study for course credit. They were informed that 
participation in the study was voluntary and completely anonymous. Questionnaire 
completion took approximately 20-30 minutes. Questionnaires included measures about 
one’s own and most Americans’ emotional responses to 9/11, policy support, and 
demographic questions. The order of one’s own and most Americans’ emotional 
responses was counterbalanced. All participants received credit as partial fulfillment of 
their research experience requirement. Six non-U.S. citizens were excluded from all 
analyses because the current research concerned Americans’ responses to terrorist threat. 
The final sample consisted of 77 women and 54 men. Participants’ ages ranged from 18 
to 33 (M = 19.8, SD = 2.57). 
Materials 
Emotional Response Measures 
To assess collective emotional responses to 9/11, a question modified from Conejero and 
Etxebarria (2007)’s study was used. Participants rated how strongly they perceive most 
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Americans feel each emotion when reminded of the 9/11 attacks. They were presented 
with a list of eight emotional items with four items to assess collective anger (angry, 
irritated, outraged, mad) and four items to assess collective fear (fearful, scared, afraid, 
frightened). They responded to each item on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (Not at all) to 
7 (Very much). Cronbach alphas for perceived collective anger (α = .85), and collective 
fear (α = .97) were high.  
Participants were also asked to report how strongly they feel each emotion when 
reminded of the 9/11 attacks. They were presented with the same list of eight emotional 
items measuring individuals’ own anger and fear. They responded to each item on a 7-
point scale ranging from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (Very much). Cronbach alphas were highly 
reliable for individuals’ own anger (α = .93) and own fear (α = .99). 
A maximum likelihood factor analysis with an oblimin rotation on all sixteen 
emotion items was conducted in order to test whether perceived collective emotions are 
distinct from individuals’ own emotions.1 When a four-factor solution was enforced, 
factor loadings after oblimin rotation showed that all own fear items loaded on the first 
factor (> .94), all perceived collective anger items loaded on the second factor (> .49), all 
perceived collective fear items loaded on the third factor (> -. 86), and all own anger 
items loaded on the fourth factor (> .75). The four factors accounted for 88% of the 
variance.2 Also, the correlations between the four factors were less than ±.60 (.18, -
                                            
1 In order to examine the distinguishability of emotional items, instead of a varimax 
rotation, I ran factor analysis with an oblimin rotation, which allowed the factors to be 
correlated and provided the correlation matrix between the factors.  
2 For the second factor, the factor loadings of perceived collective anger items 
were .75, .50, 97, and 82. Also, when no number of factors was specified, a three-factor 
solution was extracted such that factor loadings after oblimin rotation showed that all 
own fear items loaded on the first factor (> .93), and all perceived collective fear items 
loaded on the second factor (> -.83), all perceived collective anger items and all own 
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.58, .31, -.44, .57, -.19), suggesting the distinguishability of emotional items.  
  
Policy Support Measures 
To assess participants’ policy support, a total of 11 items have been modified from prior 
research (Crowson, DeBacker, & Thoma, 2005; Danso, Sedlovskaya, & Suanda, 2007; 
Pyszczynski et al., 2006) tapping three domains of counter-terrorism policies.  
 
Military Intervention 
Four items assessed participants’ support for military intervention against terrorism. 
Participants responded on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) to 
items such as “In order to protect security at home, it is necessary to take military action 
to destroy terrorist networks around the world.” High scores on this measure reflect 
greater support for military intervention against terrorism (α = .93). 
 
Anti-Immigration 
Support for anti-immigration policies was assessed by four additional items (e.g., “There 
are too many immigrants from the wrong sorts of places being admitted to the United 
States these days”). All response scales ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly 
agree). High scores represent greater support for anti-immigration policies (α = .77). 
 
Restriction of Civil Liberties 
To assess the support for restriction of civil liberties, participants were asked to respond 
                                                                                                                                  
anger items loaded together on the third factor (> .58), accounting for 83% of the 
variance. 
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three items rated on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). For 
example, participants were asked to respond to statements such as “It is sometimes 
necessary for the government to curb the civil rights of American citizens in order to 
protect the country against terrorist threats.” Higher values on this measure represented 
stronger support for restriction of civil liberties to fight against terrorism (α = .80). 
 
A maximum likelihood factor analysis with a varimax rotation on all eleven 
policy items was conducted. This analysis yielded a three-factor solution, showing that all 
military intervention items loaded strongly on the first factor (> .74), all anti-immigration 
items loaded strongly on the second factor (> .55), and all civil liberties items loaded 
strongly on the third factor (> . 66). The three factors accounted for 72% of the variance. 
Results 
Distinctiveness of Perceived Collective Emotional Responses 
Table 1 shows the means and standard deviations for the emotion and policy 
measures. An analysis of variance revealed no significant effects of question order, Fs < 
1.7, indicating that mean scores on the variables were not significantly affected by 
question order.  
Of primary interest was whether perceived collective emotional responses were 
distinct from individuals’ own emotional responses to 9/11 (Hypothesis 1). In addition to 
the factor analysis described earlier, I followed procedures used by Smith et al. (2007) to 
test this distinctiveness at the mean levels. The emotion data were submitted to a 2 
(emotion level: individual vs. collective, between-subjects) × 2 (emotion type: anger vs. 
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fear, within-subjects) mixed ANOVA.3 This analysis revealed a significant main effect o
emotion level, F(1, 129) = 22.52, p < .001. Participants reported more intense col
anger (M = 5.34, SD = 1.14) and fear (M = 5.19, SD = 1.41) in most Americans than their 
own anger (M = 4.76, SD = 1.64) and fear (M = 3.80, SD = 1.53). There was also a 
significant main effect of emotion type, F(1, 129) = 15.17, p < .001, such that reporte
anger (M = 5.06, SD = 1.43) was stronger than fear (M = 4.51, SD = 1.62). As shown in 
Figure 1, there was also a significant interaction between emotion type and level, F(1,
129) = 8.13, p < .01, showing that the own-collective difference was greater in relation to 
fear (Mean Difference = 1.26) than in relation to anger (Mean Difference = .80). Thu
predicted, perceived collective emotional responses had significantly different profiles
from individuals’ own emotional responses to 9/11. 
f 
lective 
d 
 
s, as 
 
 
Table 1 
Means and Standard Deviations of Variables in Study 1 
Variable M SD 
Collective Anger 5.46 1.11 
Own Anger 4.66 1.56 
Collective Fear 5.14 1.37 
Own Fear 3.88 1.73 
Military Intervention 3.56 1.57 
Anti-Immigration 2.97 1.34 
Restricting Civil Liberties 3.35 1.40 
 
                                            
3 I analyzed the first set of emotional responses by each participant (one’s own or 
perceived collective emotional responses, depending on the order counterbalancing) 
because the second set of emotion questions might be biased by the first set of data, 
leading people to anchor their latter responses on the former ones or to seek different 
answers than they have just provided in response to the first set of questions (see Smith et 
al., 2007 for a similar approach). 
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 Figure 1. Collective and own emotional responses to 9/11 in Study 1 
 
Relations between Collective and Own Emotional Responses 
Table 2 shows the correlations between collective and own emotional responses 
to 9/11, to test whether they were associated with each other (Hypothesis 2). As predicted, 
perceived collective anger was strongly associated with individuals’ own anger, r(131) 
= .67, p < .001, and perceived collective fear was also strongly associated with 
individuals’ own fear, r(131) = .67, p < .001. 
There were marginal differences in the strength of correlation coefficients 
between the groups of participants who received own emotion questions first and 
collective emotion question first. The correlation between collective anger and own anger 
was marginally stronger in the group exposed to collective emotion questions first, r(67) 
= .76, than in the group exposed to own emotion questions first, r(64) = .58, z = 1.87, p 
= .06. Likewise, the correlation between collective fear and own fear was marginally 
stronger in the group exposed to collective emotion questions first, r(67) = .75, than in 
the group exposed to own emotion questions first, r(64) = .56, z = 1.90, p = .057. 
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Table 2 
Correlations between Collective and Own Emotional Responses in Study 1 
Variable 1 2 3 4 
Total (n = 131) 
1. Collective Anger     
2. Own Anger .67***    
3. Collective Fear .43*** .21**   
4. Own Fear .30*** .44*** .67***  
Own-question first (n = 64) 
1. Collective Anger     
2. Own Anger .58***    
3. Collective Fear .43*** .05   
4. Own Fear .24 .30** .56***  
Collective-question first (n = 67) 
1. Collective Anger     
2. Own Anger .76***    
3. Collective Fear .44*** .38***   
4. Own Fear .35** .58*** .75***  
* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. 
In addition, the results showed significant relations between collective anger and 
own fear, r(131) = .30, p < .001, and between collective fear and own anger, r(131) = .21, 
p < .01. These relations were, however, only significant among the participants exposed 
to collective emotion questions first: Perceived collective anger was significantly 
correlated with own fear, r(67) = .35, p < .01, and perceived collective fear with own 
anger, r(67) = .38, p < .001 among participants exposed to collective emotion questions 
first, while those correlations were marginally or not significant among participants 
exposed to the own emotion questions first, r(64) = .24, p = .06, r(64) = .05, p > .71, 
respectively.  
In sum, consistent with predictions, perceived collective anger and fear were 
distinguishable, yet significantly associated with individuals’ own anger and fear, 
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respectively. Also, perceived collective anger was associated not only with individuals’ 
own anger, but with their own fear, and in a similar vein perceived collective fear was 
associated not only with individuals’ own fear and but with their own anger. These 
relations between collective- and individual-level emotions were stronger among the 
participants exposed to collective emotion questions first. 
Relations between Collective and Own Emotional Responses and Policy Support 
Table 3 shows the correlations among individuals’ own and perceived collective 
emotional responses and policy support measures. Perceived collective anger was 
significantly correlated with support for military intervention, r(131) = .33, p < .001, and 
anti-immigration policy, r(131) = .19, p < .05, but not with support for restricting civil 
liberties, r(131) = .10, p = .24. Perceived collective fear was not significantly correlated 
with any policy measures, rs < .10, ns. Also, groups with different question orders 
generally showed similar patterns of correlations between perceived collective emotional 
responses and policy measures (see Table 3). 
Compared to perceived collective emotional responses to 9/11, individuals’ own 
emotional responses were strongly associated with counter-terrorism policy support. In 
particular, individuals’ own anger was significantly correlated with all three counter-
terrorism policies (all rs > .27, all ps < .05). This pattern tended to be stronger among 
participants exposed to collective-question first, than those exposed to own-question first. 
At the same time, individuals’ own fear was significantly associated with all policy 
measures among those responding to collective-question first (rs > .26, ps < .05), but not 
associated with any policy measures among those responding to own-question first (see 
Table 3).  
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Table 3 
Correlations between Emotional Responses and Policy Support in Study 1 
 Anger Fear 
Policy Support Collective Own Collective Own 
Total (n = 131) 
Military Intervention .33*** .50*** .07 .16 
Anti-Immigration .19* .36*** .05 .19* 
Restricting Civil Liberties .10 .32*** .10 .26** 
Own-question first (n = 64) 
Military Intervention .27* .46*** -.02 -.12 
Anti-Immigration .05 .27* -.02 .07 
Restricting Civil Liberties -.00 .32* .00 .13 
Collective-question first (n = 67) 
Military Intervention .39*** .56*** .17 .42*** 
Anti-Immigration .31** .47*** .09 .26* 
Restricting Civil Liberties .20 .33** .19 .35** 
* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. 
Predictive Value of Perceived Collective Emotional Responses 
In order to test whether perceived collective anger and fear uniquely predict each policy 
outcome and whether collective anger is a stronger predictor than collective fear 
(Hypothesis 3), I built a regression model for each policy outcome, entering perceived 
collective anger and fear simultaneously.4 Perceived collective anger predicted military 
                                            
4 In the following analyses, I report the regression results using total sample (n = 131) 
instead of using groups with different question orders since there were no significant 
interactions between question order and collective emotional responses in predicting each 
policy outcome. Both groups showed similar patterns of results, except that collective 
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intervention, β = .36, t(128) = 3.94, p < .001, and anti-immigration, β = .21, t(128) = 2.13, 
p < .05. However, perceived collective fear did not uniquely predict either of these policy 
outcomes. Moreover, neither collective anger nor collective fear predicted support for 
restricting civil liberties (see Table 4).   
 
Table 4 
Standardized Coefficients from Regressions Using Collective Emotions to Predict Policy 
Support in Study 1 
 Counter-Terrorism Policy 
Emotion 
Military 
Intervention 
Anti-Immigration 
Restricting Civil 
Liberties 
Collective Anger .36*** .21* .07 
Collective Fear -.09 -.04 .07 
R2 .11** .04† .02 
† p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. 
Further, using a hierarchical regression model, I examined whether perceived 
collective emotional responses predict each policy outcome independently of individuals’ 
own emotional responses. By entering collective anger and fear in the first step and 
individuals’ own anger and fear in the second step, I tested whether perceived collective 
emotional responses remain significant predictors for each policy outcome once 
individuals’ own emotional responses are included in the model. As presented in Table 5, 
when individuals’ own emotional responses were entered in the second step, the effects 
of collective anger on military intervention and anti-immigration were no longer 
significant, ps > .75. Instead, individuals’ own anger was the only significant predictor of 
                                                                                                                                  
anger was a significant predictor of anti-immigration in the group with the collective-
question first, β = .34, t(64) = 2.56, p < .05, while it was not significant in the group with 
own-question first, β = .07, t(61) = .51, p = .61.  
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all three policy outcomes (see Table 5). 
 
Table 5 
Standardized Coefficients from Hierarchical Regressions Using Collective and Own 
Emotional Responses to Predict Policy Support in Study 1 
Military Intervention Step 1 Step 2 
Collective Anger  .36*** (t = 3.94) -.04    (t = -.31) 
Collective Fear -.09    (t = -.94)  .04    (t = .30) 
Own Anger    .57*** (t = 4.62) 
Own Fear   -.11    (t = -.87) 
R2 change  .15*** 
Total R2 .11*** .26*** 
Anti-Immigration Step 1 Step 2 
Collective Anger  .21*   (t = 2.13) -.08    (t = -.60) 
Collective Fear -.04    (t = -.43) -.05    (t = -.37) 
Own Anger    .40**  (t = 3.02) 
Own Fear    .07    (t = .51) 
R2 change   .10*** 
Total R2 .04 .14*** 
Restricting Civil Liberties Step 1 Step 2 
Collective Anger .07    (t = .77) -.21    (t = -1.62) 
Collective Fear .07    (t = .71)  .02    (t = .17) 
Own Anger    .40**  (t = 3.03) 
Own Fear    .13    (t = .98) 
R2 change   .13*** 
Total R2 .02 .14*** 
* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. 
Lastly, focusing particularly on the effects of perceived collective anger on policy 
support, I examined whether perceived collective anger predicts each policy outcome 
above and beyond the contribution to prediction made by individuals’ own anger. By 
entering collective anger in the first step and individuals’ own anger in the second step, I 
tested whether the contribution of perceived collective anger remains significant in 
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predicting each policy outcome once individuals’ own anger is included in the model. As 
shown in Table 6, when individuals’ own anger was entered in the second step, the 
effects of collective anger on military intervention and anti-immigration policy were not 
significant. Instead, individuals’ own anger was the only significant predictor of all three 
policy outcomes (see Table 6).   
 
Table 6 
Standardized Coefficients from Hierarchical Regressions Using Collective and Own 
Anger to Predict Policy Support in Study 1 
Military Intervention Step 1 Step 2 
Collective Anger  .33*** (t = 3.91) -.02    (t = -.18) 
Own Anger    .52*** (t = 5.01) 
R2 change  .15*** 
Total R2 .11*** .25*** 
Anti-Immigration Step 1 Step 2 
Collective Anger  .19*   (t = 2.16) -.10    (t = -.93) 
Own Anger    .43*** (t = 3.93) 
R2 change   .10*** 
Total R2 .04* .14*** 
Restricting Civil Liberties Step 1 Step 2 
Collective Anger  .10    (t = 1.18) -.20    (t = -1.79) 
Own Anger    .45*** (t = 4.06) 
R2 change   .11*** 
Total R2 .01 .12*** 
* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. 
In sum, perceived collective anger was positively associated with counter-
terrorism policies of military intervention and anti-immigration, while perceived 
collective fear was not significantly associated with any of the counter-terrorism policies. 
However, the effects of perceived collective anger were not significant once individuals’ 
own anger was entered, suggesting that the significant effects of collective anger on 
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policy outcomes are driven by individuals’ own anger. 
Discussion 
Study 1 provided initial evidence for the effects of perceived collective emotional 
responses to 9/11 on counter-terrorism policy support. The results showed that 
individual- and collective-level emotional profiles were not only distinguishable 
structurally, but also differed in overall mean levels (Hypothesis 1). Consistent with prior 
research (Conejero & Etxebarria, 2007), participants also perceived higher levels of anger 
and fear in most Americans compared to their own anger and fear responses to 9/11.  
Second, as predicted, perceived collective emotional responses to 9/11 were 
strongly associated with individuals’ own emotional responses (Hypothesis 2). In 
addition, correlations between collective- and individual-level anger, and between 
collective- and individual-level fear, were stronger among participants responding to the 
collective emotion questions first. These results suggest that when primed to think about 
collective emotions, people may be more likely to associate collective emotional 
responses with their own emotional responses. Such relations between collective- and 
individual-level emotions are consistent with research on emotional contagion (Hatfield 
et al., 1994) and social influence literatures (e.g., Miller & McFarland, 1991). 
Third, perceived collective anger was strongly associated with counter-terrorism 
policy support, which was consistent with Hypothesis 3, while perceived collective fear 
was not significantly associated with any of the counter-terrorism policies. The more 
anger participants perceived in most Americans in response to 9/11, the stronger support 
they showed for military intervention and anti-immigration policy. However, the role of 
individuals’ own anger should be considered in examining the effects of perceived 
collective anger on policy support. The effects of perceived collective anger on support 
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for military intervention and anti-immigration policy were not significant once 
individuals’ own anger was entered.  
Fourth, the relations among perceived collective emotions, individuals’ own 
emotions, and counter-terrorism policy support tended to be stronger in the group 
exposed to collective emotion questions first than in the group exposed to own emotion 
question first. Particularly, individuals’ own fear was significantly correlated with policy 
outcomes among those who received collective emotion questions first, while it was not 
among those who received own emotion questions first. That is, individuals’ own fear 
became associated with counter-terrorism policy support after they think about most 
Americans’ emotional responses to 9/11. It is possible that individuals’ fear of personal 
harm becomes characterized fear of group harm by exposure to collective emotional 
responses to a group threat. In a similar vein, distinguishing personal fear (i.e., fear of 
personal harm) from sociotropic fear (i.e., fear of group threat), Breckenridge and 
Zimbardo (2007) argued that sociotropic fear is predictive of counter-terrorism policy 
support, but personal fear is not.  
Although the results of Study 1 generally supported the predictions, there are a 
number of unanswered questions. First, given the nature of correlational research, it is 
hard to ensure that collective emotional responses have causal (direct or indirect) effects 
on counter-terrorism policy support. To provide direct evidence for this, it is necessary to 
conduct an experimental study, by manipulating participants’ perceptions of Americans’ 
collective emotional responses. Second, the results showed that either perceived 
collective anger or collective fear was associated with both individuals’ own anger and 
own fear. This suggests that either a high level of perceived collective anger or collective 
fear may increase individuals’ own anger and fear together, whereas either a low level of 
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perceived collective anger or fear may decrease both own anger and fear. However, this 
should be examined by an experimentally designed study. To address these issues, I 
therefore conducted Study 2, using experimental manipulations of collective anger and 
fear. 
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CHAPTER 3 
STUDY 2: EXPERIMENTAL TESTS OF COLLECTIVE EMOTIONAL RESPONSE 
EFFECTS 
Design and Hypotheses 
The results of Study 1 provided initial evidence for the effect of perceived 
collective anger on counter-terrorism policy support. In order to make a stronger case for 
the effect of collective anger and to contrast it to the effect of collective fear, it is 
necessary to demonstrate more fully the causal link between collective anger and policy 
support. To accomplish this goal, I manipulate collective anger and fear, by presenting 
participants with the results of a national poll designed to represent the current emotional 
states of American population in response to 9/11. People view the majority as reflecting 
social reality (Mugny & Perez, 1991). Thus, individuals should perceive Americans’ 
collectively shared emotions only when they believe that the majority of Americans feel 
the emotions. In contrast, when individuals see that certain emotions are shared by only a 
minority of Americans, they should not perceive the emotions as collectively shared by 
most Americans. Thus, collective anger and fear are manipulated by presenting national 
poll results representing emotional responses among the majority of Americans, and their 
effects are compared to manipulations representing emotional responses among a 
minority of Americans. Consistent with the predictions and findings in Study 1, I 
examine the following hypotheses in Study 2:  
 
Hypothesis 1: Participants exposed to the majority’s anger will show higher levels of own 
anger than those exposed to the minority’s anger. In the same way, participants exposed 
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to the majority’s fear will show higher levels of own fear than those exposed to the 
minority’s fear.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Participants exposed to the majority’s anger will support counter-terrorism 
policies more strongly than those exposed to the minority’s anger.5  
 
Hypothesis 3: The effect of collective anger on counter-terrorism policy support will be 
stronger than the effect of collective fear.  
 
Hypothesis 4: The effect of collective anger on counter-terrorism policy support will be 
mediated by individuals’ own anger.  
Methods 
Participants 
A total of 174 undergraduates of the University of Massachusetts Amherst took 
part in a study purportedly concerned with attitude and emotion. Participants were 
recruited through the Psychology Department’s subject pool and received a research 
credit for their participation. The data were collected from April to July, 2009. Five non-
U.S. citizens were excluded because of the focus of this research on Americans’ 
responses to 9/11. In addition to the five non-U.S. citizens, three U.S. citizens who 
reported that their ethnicity was Arab or Middle Eastern were excluded in the following 
analyses. Their mean scores for counter-terrorism policy support substantially lower 
                                            
5 No prediction was made for the effect of collective fear on counter-terrorism policy 
support because of no significant finding of the relation between collective fear and 
policy support in Study 1. 
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compared to other ethnic groups of U.S. citizens. The final sample included 84 women 
and 82 men. Participants’ ages ranged from 18 to 31 (M = 20.27, SD = 1.87).  
Procedure and Materials 
When participants entered the laboratory, they were randomly assigned to one of 
four experimental conditions (i.e., anger-majority, anger-minority, fear-majority, fear-
minority). To manipulate participants’ perceptions of collective anger and fear in 
response to 9/11, I used fictitious results of a national poll on people’s emotional 
responses to 9/11. For example, participants in the anger-majority condition received the 
following fictitious news article: 
 
Majority of Americans feel angry when thinking about 9/11, national poll finds 
According to a recent national poll, a majority of Americans feel angry when they think about 9/11 terrorist 
attack. The latest national poll, conducted in 2009, finds that 85% of Americans feel angry “a great deal” 
(75%) or “a moderate amount” (10%) when they think about 9/11. Only 5% say that a reminder of the 
terrorist attacks does not lead them to feel angry at all.    
A great deal 
A moderate 
amount 
Not 
much Not at all 
 
75% 10% 8% 
5
% 
2
%
 
No response 
In the anger-minority condition, participants received the same information but 
replacing “angry” by “not angry” and changing figure indices accordingly. Parallel 
manipulations were used in the fear-majority and fear-minority conditions. Following the 
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manipulations, participants across all conditions were asked to respond to a series of 
questions concerning emotional responses to 9/11 and counter-terrorism policy support. 
Lastly, they were debriefed and thanked for their participation. 
Manipulation Checks 
Two manipulation check measures were used. First, a single-item question was used to 
assess whether participants interpreted the data presented accurately or not. Participants 
in the anger conditions, for example, were asked to respond to the following question, 
“According to the national poll in your reading, do a majority of Americans feel “angry” 
or “not angry” when they think about 9/11?” In the fear conditions, participants received 
the same question but replacing “angry” by “fearful.” As a second manipulation check, I 
measured collective emotion responses to 9/11 with the same items used in Study 1 to 
assess collective anger and fear (α = .91, α = .98, respectively). 
Own Emotional Response Measures 
To assess the effects of manipulations on individuals’ own emotions, I measured 
individuals’ own anger and fear in response to 9/11 with the same items used in Study 1 
(α = .90, α = .99, respectively). 
Policy Support Measures 
The same policy measures were used as in Study 1, and each constituted a reliable scale 
(military intervention: α = .92; anti-immigration: α = .86; restriction of civil liberty: α 
= .82). As in Study 1, the same maximum likelihood factor analysis with a varimax 
rotation showed that all military intervention items loaded strongly on the first factor 
(> .76), all anti-immigration items loaded strongly on the second factor (> .64), and all 
civil liberties items loaded strongly on the third factor (> .68). The three factors 
accounted 81% of the variance.  
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Results 
Prior to data analyses, seven participants were excluded because they incorrectly 
interpreted the manipulations they received.6 All analyses reported below were conducted 
on the remaining sample (n = 159). 
Manipulation Checks 
The effectiveness of the manipulations of collective emotions was examined in 
two ways: 1) by comparing levels of perceived collective emotion in the corresponding 
majority and minority conditions (e.g., anger-majority vs. anger-minority); and 2) by 
comparing perceived collective emotion across emotion conditions (e.g., anger-majority 
vs. fear-majority). For example, if the manipulations of collective anger were successful, 
I should find a significant difference in participants’ perceived collective anger between 
the anger-majority and –minority conditions such that the participants in the anger-
majority condition perceive a higher level of anger in most Americans than those in the 
anger-minority condition. Also, the participants’ perceived collective anger in the anger-
majority condition should be stronger than in the fear-majority condition. 
First, I conducted an independent-samples t test for perceived collective anger 
across the two anger conditions. As predicted, the results showed that the participants in 
the anger-majority condition (M = 5.56, SD = .96) perceived greater collective anger than 
did those in the anger-minority condition (M = 4.02, SD = 1.50), t(78) = 5.48, p < .001. 
The manipulations of collective fear were checked in a similar way. An independent-
samples t test revealed that the participants in the fear-majority condition (M = 5.61, SD 
                                            
6 These participants were equally distributed across the experimental conditions. One 
participant in the anger-majority condition, two in the anger-minority condition, two in 
the fear-majority condition, and two in the fear-minority condition incorrectly recognized 
the collective emotion information they received.  
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= .93) perceived greater collective fear than did those in the fear-minority condition (M = 
4.27, SD = 1.66), t(77) = 4.37, p < .001. 
 
Table 7 
Perceived Collective Emotional Responses by Conditions in Study 2 
 Collective Anger  Collective Fear 
Emotion Majority Minority  Majority Minority 
Perceived Collective Emotional Responses to 9/11 
Anger 5.56 (.96) a 4.02 (1.50) b  5.49 (.85) a 5.13 (1.07) a 
Fear 5.38 (1.08) a 4.49 (1.30) b  5.61 (.93) a 4.27 (1.66) b 
Note. All scales ranged from 1 to 7. Values are given as means, SD within parentheses. 
Subscripts should be interpreted within rows only; means with the same subscript do not 
differ from each other at the level of .05.  
One way analyses of variance (ANOVAs) comparing all four conditions also 
revealed significant differences in perceived collective anger and fear across the 
conditions, F(3, 155) = 16.01 and 10.37, ps < .001. As seen in Table 7, Tukey post-hoc 
tests indicated that while perceived collective anger in the anger-majority condition 
differed from the anger-minority condition, it did not differ from the fear-majority and –
minority conditions. Unexpectedly, participants in both fear-majority and -minority 
conditions perceived anger in most Americans as much as did those in the anger-majority 
condition, showing higher levels of perceived anger than the anger-minority condition. 
Additionally, while perceived collective fear in the fear-majority condition was 
significant stronger than the fear-minority condition, it did not differ from the anger-
majority condition (see Table 7). Participants in the anger-majority condition perceived 
fear in most Americans as much as did those in the fear-majority condition.7 
                                            
7 These unexpected results made it hard to differentiate one condition from others in 
terms of self-reported perceived collective emotions. However, compared with their 
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In sum, as expected, participants exposed to the majority’s emotion perceived the 
corresponding emotion in most Americans more strongly than did those exposed to the 
minority’s emotion. However, unexpectedly, participants in both the fear-majority and –
minority conditions perceived collective anger as strongly as those in the anger-majority 
condition. Also, collective fear was perceived by participants in the anger-majority 
condition as strongly as those in the fear-majority condition. In other words, high levels 
of both collective anger and fear were reported in the majority conditions (i.e., anger- and 
fear-majority conditions), while low levels of both collective anger and fear were 
reported only in the anger-minority condition.    
Own Emotional Responses 
I then tested whether the manipulations of collective emotional responses affected 
individuals’ own emotional responses. First, to test Hypothesis 1, I conducted an 
independent-samples t test across the anger-majority and –minority conditions for 
individuals’ own anger. As predicted, participants in the anger-majority condition (M = 
4.93, SD = 1.57) reported greater own anger in response to 9/11 than did those in the 
anger-minority condition, (M = 3.82, SD = 1.60), t(77) = 3.11, p < .01. However, an 
ANOVA comparing all four conditions revealed other significant differences in own 
anger across the conditions, F(3, 153) = 4.12, p < .01. Tukey post-hoc tests indicated that 
own anger of participants in the anger-majority condition did not differ from that of 
participants in the fear-majority and –minority conditions (see Table 8).8  
                                                                                                                                  
primary comparison conditions (i.e., minority conditions), the manipulations of collective 
emotions proved to be successful. In the following analyses, I used experimentally 
manipulated collective emotions or exposure to the majority’s or a minority’s emotions, 
for collective emotion manipulations, differentiating them from perceived collective 
emotions. 
8 Although a Tukey post-hoc test indicated a marginal significant difference in own 
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Table 8 
Own Emotional Responses by Conditions in Study 2 
 Collective Anger  Collective Fear 
Emotion Majority Minority  Majority Minority 
Individuals’ Own Emotional Responses to 9/11 
Anger 4.93 (1.57)a 3.82 (1.60)b  4.72 (1.27)a 4.60 (1.53)ab 
Fear 4.20 (1.86)a 3.82 (1.76)a  4.29 (1.88)a 3.39 (1.58)a 
Note. All scales ranged from 1 to 7. Values are given as means, SD within parentheses. 
Subscripts should be interpreted within rows only; means with the same subscript do not 
differ from each other at the level of .05. 
Similarly, I conducted an independent-samples t test across the fear-majority and 
–minority conditions for individuals’ own fear. As predicted, participants in the fear-
majority condition (M = 4.29, SD = 1.88) reported greater own fear in response to 9/11 
than did those in the fear-minority condition, (M = 3.39, SD = 1.58), t(76) = 2.29, p < .05. 
However, an ANOVA comparing all four conditions revealed only marginal differences, 
F(3, 153) = 2.13, p < .10, such that participants’ own fear in the fear-majority condition 
did not differ from that of participants in the anger-majority and minority conditions (all 
ps > .11).9 
Policy Support 
To test whether collective anger leads to counter-terrorism policy support 
(Hypothesis 2), I first conducted independent samples t tests comparing scores on the 
policy measures for participants in the anger-majority condition with those on the anger-
minority condition. Second, I conducted ANOVAs comparing all four conditions to test 
                                                                                                                                  
anger between the anger-minority and fear-minority conditions (p = .095), independent 
samples t tests showed its significant difference, t(79) = 2.24, p < .05.  
9 Unlike the results of Tukey post-hoc tests, independent samples t tests showed the 
significant difference in own fear between the anger-majority and the fear-minority 
conditions, t(78) = 2.10, p < .05. No other significant differences were found.  
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whether counter-terrorism policy support in the anger-majority condition was stronger 
than in the fear conditions (Hypothesis 3).  
An independent samples t test revealed marginal effects of collective anger on 
support for anti-immigration policy, t(78) = 1.80, p = .076, and restricting civil liberties, 
t(78) = 1.73, p = .089. Participants in the anger-majority condition supported anti-
immigration policy and restricting civil liberties marginally more strongly than did those 
in the anger-minority condition (see Table 9 for Means and SDs). 
 
Table 9 
Policy Support by Conditions in Study 2 
 Collective Anger  Collective Fear 
Policy Support Majority Minority  Majority Minority 
Military Intervention 3.41 (1.36)a 3.39 (1.74)a  3.68 (1.36)a 3.68 (1.40) a 
Anti-Immigration 2.71 (1.45)ab 2.14 (1.35)b  3.12 (1.57)a 2.80 (1.35)ab 
Restricting Civil Liberties 3.16 (1.55)ab 2.57 (1.52)b  3.33 (1.39)ab 3.58 (1.55)a 
Note. All scales ranged from 1 to 7. Values are given as means, SD within parentheses. 
Subscripts should be interpreted within rows only; means with the same subscript do not 
differ from each other at the level of .05. 
Also, an ANOVA was conducted to compare scores on the policy measures for 
participants in the anger-majority condition with those on the fear conditions. The results 
revealed significant differences across the conditions in support for anti-immigration 
policy, F(3, 155) = 3.18, p < .05, and restricting civil liberties, F(3, 155) = 3.28, p < .05. 
As seen in Table 9, Tukey post-hoc tests indicated that participants’ support for anti-
immigration policy in the fear-majority condition (M = 3.12, SD = 1.57) was stronger 
than in the anger-minority condition (M = 2.14, SD = 1.35), and their support for 
restricting civil liberties in the fear-minority condition (M = 3.58, SD = 1.55) was 
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stronger than in the anger-minority condition (M = 2.57, SD = 1.52) (both ps < .05).10 
Participants’ support for anti-immigration policy and restricting civil liberties in the 
anger-majority condition did not differ from the fear-majority and fear-minority 
conditions (see also Figure 3). 
 
Figure 2. Policy support by conditions in Study 2 
In sum, collective anger had a marginal effect on counter-terrorism policy support. 
Participants who were exposed to the majority’s anger were more likely to support anti-
immigration policy and restriction of civil liberties than did those exposed to the 
minority’s anger. Unexpectedly, participants exposed to collective fear – whether from a 
majority or minority – showed stronger support for anti-immigration policy and 
restricting civil liberties. 
Mediation Analyses 
                                            
10 Although Tukey post-hoc tests indicated significant difference in support for anti-
immigration policy between the fear-majority and anger-minority conditions and 
significant difference in support for restricting civil liberties between the fear-minority 
and anger-minority condition, independent samples t tests revealed that participants in the 
fear-majority condition supported anti-immigration policy, t(76) = 2.95, p < .01, and 
restricting civil liberties, t(76) = 2.32, p < .05, more strongly than did those in the anger-
minority condition, and that participants in the fear-minority condition did too, t(79) = 
2.21, p < .05, t(79) = 2.96, p < .01, respectively.  
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Using the Baron and Kenny (1986) technique, I then tested whether the effects of 
collective anger on support for anti-immigration and restricting civil liberties may be 
mediated by individuals’ own anger (Hypothesis 4).11 
Using participants in the anger conditions, collective anger was coded as 1 for the 
anger-majority condition and 0 for the anger-minority condition. Collective anger was a 
marginally significant predictor of support for anti-immigration policy, β = .20, t(79) = 
1.80, p = .076, and collective anger predicted individuals’ own anger, β = .33, t(78) = 
3.11, p < .01. However, support for anti-immigration policy was not predicted by own 
anger, β = .09, t(78) = .79, ns. Thus, individuals’ own anger did not mediate the effect of 
collective anger on support for anti-immigration policy.  
Next, I performed a parallel analysis to predict support for restricting civil 
liberties (see Figure 4). Collective anger marginally predicted support for restricting civil 
liberties, β = .19, t(79) = 1.73, p = .089, and as shown earlier, collective anger predicted 
individuals’ own anger, β = .33, t(78) = 3.11, p < .01. Moreover, own anger predicted 
support for restricting civil liberties, β = .35, t(78) = 3.24, p < .01. When both collective 
anger and own anger were entered as predictors of support for restricting civil liberties, 
own anger was significant, β = .32, t(78) = 2.82, p < .01, but collective anger was not, β 
= .08, t(78) = .68, ns. A Sobel test (1982) revealed significant mediation (z = 2.09, p 
< .05). 
In sum, the mediation analyses showed that individuals’ own anger mediated the 
marginal effect of collective anger on support for restricting civil liberties, but not for 
anti-immigration policy.  
                                            
11 Here I conducted mediation analyses for support for anti-immigration policy and 
restricting civil liberties not for support for military intervention since collective anger 
manipulations did not affect support for military intervention in Study 2.   
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Collective Anger 
Restricting  
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.33** .35** (.32**) 
.19† (.08) 
Own Anger 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Own anger as mediator for effects of collective anger on support for restricting 
civil liberties in Study 2. Coefficients in parentheses represent parameter estimates for a 
regression model containing both predictors.  
† p < .10. ** p < .01. 
Moderation Analyses 
In addition to mediation analyses, I explored the moderating role of individual’s 
own emotions between perceived collective emotions and counter-terrorism policy 
support. Given that the effects of collective emotions can be either moderated or 
mediated by individuals’ own emotions, both mediation and moderation analyses may 
help to find how collective emotions affect individuals’ support for counter-terrorism 
policies. First, I examined whether the effects of collective emotions on policy support 
were moderated by individuals’ own anger. Participants were assigned to either the high 
or low anger group on the basis of a median split of the distribution of individuals’ own 
anger (Mdn = 4.75). 2 (own anger: low vs. high) × 2 (collective anger: majority vs. 
minority) ANOVAs revealed no significant interactions between collective anger and 
own anger for military intervention, F(1, 75) < 1, ns, anti-immigration policy, F(1, 75) < 
1, ns, and restricting civil liberties, F(1, 75) = 2.28, p = .14. No other effects approached 
significance except a main effect of own anger on restricting civil liberties, F(1, 75) = 
5.08, p < .05, showing that high-anger participants supported for restricting civil liberties 
more strongly than did low-anger counterparts. Similarly, 2 (own anger: low vs. high) × 2 
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(collective fear: majority vs. minority) ANOVAs revealed no significant interactions 
between collective anger and own anger, all Fs < 1, ns. There were main effects of own 
anger on anti-immigration policy, F(1, 74) = 10.43, p < .01, and restricting civil liberties, 
F(1, 74) = 8.50, p < .01, showing that high-anger participants supported for these policies 
more strongly than did low-anger counterparts.  
Next, I examined the moderating effects of individuals’ own fear in the 
relationship between collective emotions and counter-terrorism policy support. 
Participants were assigned to either the high or low fear group on the basis of a median 
split of the distribution of individuals’ own fear (Mdn = 4.00). 2 (own fear: low vs. high) 
× 2 (collective anger: majority vs. minority) ANOVAs revealed no significant 
interactions between collective anger and own fear for military intervention, anti-
immigration policy, and restricting civil liberties, all Fs < 1, ns. No other effects 
approached significance except main effects of own fear on military intervention, F(1, 
75) = 5.34, p < .05, and restricting civil liberties, F(1, 75) = 14.16, p < .001, showing that 
high-fear participants supported for these policies more strongly than did low-fear 
counterparts. Similarly, 2 (own fear: low vs. high) × 2 (collective fear: majority vs. 
minority) ANOVAs revealed no significant interactions between collective fear and own 
fear, all Fs < 2.54, ns. No other effects approached significance except that there was a 
marginal main effect of own fear on support for restricting civil liberties, F(1, 74) = 3.42, 
p = .069, showing that high-fear participants supported for restricting civil liberties more 
strongly than did low-fear counterparts.  
In sum, there were no significant interactions between individuals’ own emotions 
and collective emotions. These insignificant results in turn supported the original 
postulate that individuals’ own emotions mediate the effects of collective emotions on 
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their policy support.  
Discussion 
Using experimental manipulations, Study 2 provided additional support for some 
results of Study 1. First, consistent with the findings of Study 1 showing positive 
correlations between perceived collective and own emotional responses to 9/11, Study 2 
showed that experimentally manipulated collective anger increased perceivers’ own 
anger (Hypothesis 1) as did collective fear. These findings suggest that individuals 
exposed to collective emotional responses tend to shift their emotional response in the 
direction of what they perceive to be the emotional responses of the collective. 
Furthermore, Study 2 provided causal evidence on whether either collective anger or 
collective fear affects both individuals’ own anger and own fear. Although Study 1 found 
that either perceived collective anger or collective fear was associated with both 
individuals’ own anger and own fear, it was unknown how each perceived collective 
anger and collective fear increases or decreases either or both individuals’ own anger and 
own fear. Study 2 showed that either exposure to the majority’s anger or the majority’s 
fear led to high levels of both own anger and own fear. On the other hand, exposure to the 
minority’s emotion decreased individuals’ own emotion which corresponded only to the 
presented emotion. That is, participants exposed to the minority’s anger reported a low 
level of own anger only, whereas those exposed to the minority’s fear reported a low 
level of own fear only. 
Second, collective anger manipulations had marginal effects on support for anti-
immigration policy and restricting civil liberties (Hypothesis 2), and individuals’ own 
anger mediated the marginal effect of collective anger on support for restricting civil 
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liberties (Hypothesis 4). While perceived collective anger was significantly associated 
with support for military intervention and anti-immigration policy in Study 1, 
experimentally manipulated collective anger had marginal effects on support for anti-
immigration policy and restricting civil liberties in Study 2. In addition, the prediction 
that participants exposed to the majority’s anger supported counter-terrorism policies 
than those exposed to the majority’s fear (Hypothesis 3) was not supported. Participants’ 
support for counter-terrorism policies (i.e., anti-immigration policy, restricting civil 
liberties) was as strong in the fear-majority condition as in the anger-majority condition. 
However, this is not surprising in that participants exposed to the majority’s fear showed 
high levels of perceived collective and own anger as strong as those exposed to the 
majority’s anger. 
Third, Study 2 provided interesting findings about how individuals perceive 
collective anger and fear when exposed to either of them. The results showed that 
participants exposed to either the majority’s anger or fear reported high levels of both 
perceived collective anger and fear. On the other hand, participants exposed to the 
minority’s anger showed low levels of both perceived collective anger and fear, while 
participants in the fear-minority condition reported a low level of perceived collective 
fear, but a high level of perceived collective anger. However, the findings that perceived 
collective anger and perceived collective fear vary together under the anger-majority and 
fear-majority conditions make it hard to interpret some effects of collective emotion 
manipulations on counter-terrorism policy support. For example, since participants 
exposed to the majority’s anger perceived high levels of both collective anger and 
collective fear, it cannot be sure whether increased support for counter-terrorism policies 
results from a high level of perceived collective anger or collective fear. On the other 
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hand, the findings of their unparalleled relation between the anger-minority and fear-
minority conditions, provides an explanation about why individuals exposed to the 
minority’s fear support counter-terrorism policies. Since exposure to the minority’ fear 
lessens participants’ perception of collective fear, but not their perception of collective 
anger, their enduring perception of a high level of collective anger may cause strong 
support for counter-terrorism policies. 
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CHAPTER 4 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Post-September 11 national polls found that a majority of Americans supported 
governmental counter-terrorism policies such as military intervention, restricting civil 
liberties, and anti-immigration (e.g., Gallup Poll, 2008; Huddy et al., 2002). Witnessing 
this widespread support, many researchers have explored social psychological 
explanations for the links between terrorist attacks and counter-terrorism policy support, 
with a focus on the role of individuals’ own emotions, particularly anger and fear in 
response to 9/11. Moving beyond an understanding of the role of individual-level 
emotional responses in counter-terrorism policy support (e.g., Cheung-Blunden & 
Blunden, 2008a, 2008b; Sadler et al., 2005), the present studies examined how perceived 
collective emotions affect individuals’ own emotions as well as their policy support in 
response to 9/11.  
Influence of Collective Emotional Responses on Policy Support 
Consistent with past research (i.e., Conejero & Etxebarria, 2007), Study 1 found 
that perceived collective emotional responses (i.e., perceived collective anger) did not 
predict support for counter-terrorism policies independent of individuals’ own emotional 
responses (i.e., own anger). Instead, the findings of Study 1 and 2 suggest that perceived 
collective anger may exert an indirect influence on counter-terrorism policy support 
through its effects on individuals’ own anger. Using self-reported measures, Study 1 
showed that perceived collective anger predicted military intervention and anti-
immigration policy support. Furthermore, Study 2 showed that experimentally-
manipulated collective anger had marginal effects on support for anti-immigration policy 
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and restricting civil liberties, and that individuals’ own anger mediated the marginal 
effect of collective anger on support for restricting civil liberties. It should be noted that 
the effects of collective anger manipulations on support for counter-terrorism policies 
may not be equivalent to the effects of perceived collective anger on support for those 
policies. Since exposure to the majority’s anger in Study 2 increases both collective anger 
and collective fear at the perceptual level, the effects of experimentally manipulated 
collective anger on support for anti-immigration policy and restricting civil liberties may 
not result from perceived collective anger only. However, with respect to support for 
anti-immigration policy, given the findings of Study 1 showing that perceived collective 
anger, not perceived collective fear, was significantly associated with support for anti-
immigration policy, perceived collective anger is more likely to increase counter-
terrorism policy support than perceived collective fear. Nevertheless, it cannot be sure 
whether perceived collective anger and/or fear involves increased support for restricting 
civil liberties.  
In addition to the effects of experimentally manipulated collective anger on 
support for anti-immigration policy and restricting civil liberties, Study 2 found the 
effects of exposures to the majority’s and the minority’s fear on support for those policies. 
Like those exposed to the majority’s anger, individuals exposed to the majority’s fear 
reported high levels of both perceived collective anger and fear, which makes it hard to 
determine whether perceived collective anger or fear increases support for anti-
immigration policy and restricting civil liberties. Again, based on the findings of 
significant relation between perceived collective anger (not fear) and support for anti-
immigration policy in Study 1, it seems more possible that perceived collective anger as a 
result of exposure to the majority’s fear involves increase support for anti-immigration 
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policy. However, no plausible explanation is possible to determine whether the effect of 
exposure to the majority’s fear on support for restricting civil liberties can be derived 
from perceived collective anger and/or fear. Nevertheless, with respect to the effects of 
exposure to the minority’s fear on support for anti-immigration policy and restricting 
civil liberties, perceived collective anger must play a role in support for both policies 
since perceived collective anger, not perceived collective fear, is heightened as a 
consequence of exposure to the minority’s fear.12    
Emotional Dynamics in Perceived Collective Emotional Responses 
To the author’s knowledge, the current research is the first to examine the effects 
of collective anger and fear separately. Study 1 found the close relationship between 
perceived collective anger and fear in response to 9/11. Furthermore, Study 2 showed that 
individuals exposed to either the majority’s anger or fear perceived high levels of both 
collective anger and fear. It is possible that, when faced with a group threat such as 9/11, 
individuals witness a great deal of anger and fear in others and thereby associate one with 
the other. However, there were unparalleled results when individuals were exposed to the 
minority’s emotion. Individuals exposed to the minority’s anger perceived low levels of 
both collective anger and fear, while those exposed to the minority’s fear perceived a low 
level of collective fear, but a high level of collective anger. When either anger or fear in 
response to a group threat is widespread in public, individuals’ increased perception of 
one collective emotion can be easily transferred to the perception of the other emotion. 
However, when either anger or fear is not salient in public, individuals seem reluctant to 
extend their perception of low collective fear to collective anger, but not from collective 
                                            
12 This, in turn, suggests that perceived collective anger may increase support for 
restricting civil liberties in the anger-majority and fear-majority condition. 
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anger to collective fear. That is, individuals who initially perceive a low level of 
collective anger may automatically assume a low level of collective fear, but those who 
initially perceive a low level of collective fear may not decrease their perception of 
collective anger without perceiving a low level of collective anger by themselves. 
Consistent with emotional convergence literature (e.g., Barsade, 2002; Hatfield et 
al., 1994; Totterdell et al., 1998), the perceptions of collective emotions as a result of the 
exposures to the collective emotions affect individuals’ own emotions. The emotional 
change in individuals’ own anger and fear showed similar patterns of the change in their 
perceptions of collective anger and fear.13 
Intra-Group Emotional Process as a Potential Mechanism for Collective Actions 
Social psychological literature has documented perceptual discrepancy between 
oneself and a majority of others in attitudes and behaviors, when there is actually 
remarkable agreement within the group (e.g., Miller & McFarland, 1991; Prentice & 
Miller, 1996 for a review). Consistent with the findings of Conejero and Etxebarria 
(2007), Study 1 showed that individuals believe that most Americans experience anger 
and fear in response 9/11 more intensely than do they themselves experience. Although 
future studies are needed to examine this by using a nationally representative sample of 
U.S. citizens, it is likely to appear because of external factors such as repetitive imagery 
of damage and emotional-laden messages in post-September 11 news coverage (Cho et 
al., 2003; Scheufele, Nisbet, & Ostman, 2005). A nationwide study found that 85% of 
                                            
13 Individuals’ perceptions of collective emotions and their own corresponding emotions 
tended to vary together. One difference is that there was no significant difference in 
individuals’ own fear between the anger-majority (M = 4.20, SD = 1.86) and anger-
minority conditions (M = 3.82, SD = 1.76), t(77) = .93, p = .35, while there was 
significant difference in individuals’ perception of collective fear between these 
conditions (see Table 6).   
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respondents watched TV news coverage about the 9/11 attacks in the week following the 
attacks more than 1 hour per day, and that exposure to TV news coverage about the 9/11 
was associated with anxiety about future terrorism during the 6 months following the 
attacks (Silver, Holman, McIntosh, Poulin, & Gil-Rivas, 2002). Study 2 furthermore 
demonstrated the effects of exposure to the majority’s anger on individuals’ own anger 
and their support for anti-immigration policy and restricting civil liberties. Taken together, 
if individuals are reminded of collective anger in response to 9/11, which is mistakenly 
perceived to be more intense than their own, they may intensify their own anger and shift 
their support for counter-terrorism policies in the direction where their misperception of 
collective anger guides. Thus, the collective actions developed through this process could 
be more extreme and homogenous.   
Limitations 
There are limitations to these findings. First, there was no control group which 
can be compared with both effects of manipulations of collective anger and fear in Study 
2. The primary goal of Study 2 was to demonstrate the effects of collective anger (i.e., the 
majority’s anger) on counter-terrorism policy support. Here, the anger-majority condition 
was first directly compared with the anger-minority condition to test the effects of 
collective anger on individuals’ own emotions and their support for counter-terrorism 
policies. Then, the anger-majority condition was compared with the fear-majority 
condition to test whether the effects of collective anger were stronger than those of 
collective fear. The assumptions underlying these predictions were that participants 
exposed to the minority’s emotions would show the baselines of perceived collective 
emotions (low levels of collective emotions), and that manipulations of collective 
emotions (i.e., the majority’s emotions) would increase participants’ perceived collective 
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emotions compared to the baselines. Also, collective emotion manipulations were 
supposed to affect participants’ perceptions of the corresponding collective emotions only. 
However, it turned out those were not the case. Participants exposed to collective anger, 
for example, reported high levels of perceived collective anger as well as collective fear. 
This did not mean that the manipulations were failures, because it may be due to the 
nature of collective emotional responses to 9/11. Future studies should address this issue 
in more detail to better understand the nature of collective emotional responses to a group 
threat.  
Second, the data of the current research were collected in 2009, eight years after 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Many people who supported counter-terrorism policies, in 
particular, military intervention in Iraq in 2003 may have changed their opinions in the 
meanwhile. Also, people who felt intense anger or fear right after 9/11 may not feel the 
same extent of the feeling any longer. However, the main focus of the current research is 
to examine the relationships among collective emotional responses, own emotional 
responses, and counter-terrorism policy support (Study 1), and to demonstrate the effects 
of collective emotional responses on individuals’ own emotional responses and their 
support for counter-terrorism policies by experimental manipulations (Study 2). Although 
the time that has passed since 9/11 may affect those relationships and effects of the 
current research, its findings can be still meaningful in that reminding 9/11 affects 
individuals living at the present moment.    
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
The current research provided evidence on the effects of perceived collective 
anger in response to the September 11th terrorist attacks on counter-terrorism policy 
support. Although much research has emphasized the effects of individual-level 
emotional responses to a group threat on their group-based decisions such as 
governmental policy support (e.g., Cheung-Blunden, & Blunden, 2008a, 2008b; Lerner et 
al., 2003; Sadler et al., 2005), few studies to date have attempted to understand how 
individual group members shape their emotional and attitudinal responses to a group 
threat in intra-group emotional contexts. The current findings suggest that, in response to 
a group threat such as 9/11, individuals are affected by others’ emotions and shift their 
policy support in the direction of what the collective emotional responses guide. To the 
extent that this process is grounded in overestimated public emotions, individuals’ 
rational decision-making could be potentially undermined. Overall, the current research 
contributes to better understanding of individuals’ group-based attitudes and behaviors, 
by providing a broader framework of intra-group emotions. 
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APPENDIX A 
MEASURES IN STUDY 1 
 
“When thinking about 9/11, to what extent do you think most Americans feel each of the 
following emotions?” 
Perceived collective emotional responses to 9/11 (8 items) 
1. angry, irritated, outraged, mad 
2. fearful, scared, afraid, frightened 
 
“When thinking about 9/11, to what extent do you feel each of the following emotions?” 
One’s own emotional responses to 9/11 (8 items) 
1. angry, irritated, outraged, mad 
2. fearful, scared, afraid, frightened 
 
Policy support: Military intervention items (4 items) 
1. In order to protect security at home, it is necessary to take military action to 
destroy terrorist networks around the world 
2. It is entirely appropriate to engage in preemptive attacks on countries or terrorist 
groups that may pose a threat to the United States in the future. 
3. The best way of defending the United States is sometimes to engage in military 
action against countries or terrorist groups that may pose a serious threat to our 
country in the future.  
4. The United States should engage in military intervention to fight against terrorism. 
 
Policy support: Anti-immigration policy items (4 items)  
1. There are too many immigrants from the wrong sorts of places being admitted to 
the United States these days. 
2. It is about time the Unites States closes its borders to all immigrants. 
3. Immigrants take jobs away from Americans. 
4. New immigrants are more often involved in criminality than average.  
 
Policy support: Anti-immigration policy toward Arabs items (4 items)  
1. The U.S. should severely reduce immigration from the Middle East. 
2. The U.S. government should deport Arab Americans. 
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3. If immigration continues as its present rate, Arab culture threatens to overwhelm 
American culture.  
4. American society is negatively impacted through the continued influx of 
immigration from the Middle East. 
 
Policy support: Restriction of civil liberties items (3 items) 
1. It is sometimes necessary for the government to curb the civil rights of American 
citizens in order to protect the country against terrorist threats. 
2. Freedom of speech is very desirable in our democratic country, but not under 
national emergence such as terrorist attacks or war. 
3. Under the situation threatening national security, we should sacrifice our liberty 
because otherwise we all might be in danger. 
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APPENDIX B 
MANIPULATIONS OF COLLECTIE ANGER AND FEAR USED IN STUDY 2 
 
(Anger-Majority) 
Majority of Americans feel angry when thinking about 9/11, national poll finds 
According to a recent national poll, a majority of Americans feel angry when they think 
about 9/11 terrorist attack. The latest national poll, conducted in 2009, finds that 85% of 
Americans feel angry “a great deal” (75%) or “a moderate amount” (10%) when they 
think about 9/11. Only 5% say that reminding the terrorist attacks does not lead them to 
feel angry at all.    
A great deal 
A moderate 
amount 
Not 
much 
Not at 
all 
 
75% 10% 8% 
5
% 
2
%
 
No response 
(Anger-Minority) 
Majority of Americans not angry when thinking about 9/11, national poll finds 
A majority of Americans do not feel angry when they think about the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks. The latest national poll, conducted in 2009, finds that Americans feel angry “not 
at all” (75%) or “not much” (10%) when they think about 9/11. Only 5% say that 
remembering the terrorist attacks leads them to feel angry a great deal.    
Not at all 
Not 
much 
A moderate 
amount 
A great 
deal 
 
75% 10% 8% 
5
% 
2
%
 
No response 
(Fear-Majority) 
Majority of Americans fearful when thinking about 9/11, national poll finds 
According to a recent national poll, a majority of Americans feel fearful when they think 
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about 9/11 terrorist attack. The latest national poll, conducted in 2009, finds that 
Americans feel fearful “a great deal” (75%) or “a moderate amount” (10%) when they 
think about 9/11. Only 5% say that the 9/11 terrorist attacks do not lead them to feel 
angry at all.    
A great deal 
A moderate 
amount 
Not 
much 
Not at 
all 
 
75% 10% 8% 
5
% 
2
%
 
No response 
(Fear-Minority) 
Majority of Americans not fearful when thinking about 9/11, national poll finds 
A majority of Americans do not feel fearful when they think about the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks. The latest national poll, conducted in 2009, finds that Americans feel angry “not 
at all” (75%) or “not much” (10%) when they think about 9/11. Only 5% say that 
remembering the terrorist attacks leads them to feel fearful a great deal.    
Not at all 
Not 
much 
A moderate 
amount 
A great 
deal 
 
75% 10% 8% 
5
% 
2
%
 
No response 
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